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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

NIC #1161-8

NIC #1161-83 10 February 1983 NIC 1161-83 10 February 1983

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National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH

SA/DCI/IAS

FROM

Milton Kovner

National Intelligence Officer

for Western Europe

SUBJECT

Briefing Materials for NSC Meeting on Vice President Bush's Visit to Europe

Attached are briefing materials for the subject meeting prepared by the DDI (EURA) and this office. The package consists of a brief background paper, issues that need further clarification, excerpts from conversations the Vice President had with key European leaders, and selected cables, including those just received from the Paris meetings.

Mil Kovner

Attachments •

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THROUGH :	

FROM : NIO/WE

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Meeting on Vice President Bush's Visit to Europe


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FOR THE SECRETARY PASS TO VICE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF OF STAFF, ADMIRAL MURPHY

E.O. 12356: DECL, OADR TAGS: OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE) SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS IN PARIS

(CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT)

FOUR THEMES APPEARED IN THE CONVERSATIONS VICE PRESI-DENT BUSH HAD WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND, PRIME MINISTER MAUROY, FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON AND FINANCE MINISTER DELORS AND IN THE STAFF DISCUSSIONS AROUND THESE MEETINGS:

FIRST AND FOREMOST, THE NEED TO DEPLOY INF TO PREVENT THE SLIDE IN GERMANY TOWARD DEMILITARIZATION AND THE DECOUPLING OF AMERICA FROM EUROPE. THE MITTERRAND

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GOVERNMENT REGARDS THE SS-20, WITHOUT A COUNTERWEAPON IN WESTERN EUROPE, AS THE MOST SERIOUS THREAT EUROPE HAS FACED FROM THE USSR. THE PRESSURE FOR ACCOMMODATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE GREATLY INCREASED BY THE FEAR THAT THE USE OF THESE WEAPONS WILL NOT NECESSARILY PROVUKE A U.S. NUCLEAR RESPONSE. THE VICE PRESIDENT'S PRAISE FOR THE BUNDESTAG SPEECH WENT DOWN VERY WELL WITH MITTERRAND AND CHEYSSON.

- (B) SECONDLY, THE FRENCH SEEMED QUITE ANXIOUS TO EXPLAIN THE SUCCESSES OF THIS SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT, AS IF THEY FEARED THE U.S. WAS LOSING CONFIDENCE IN THE SOCIALIST ABILITY TO GOVERN. MAUROY IN PARTICULAR WENT INTO CONSIDERABLE ECONOMIC DETAIL ON PROGRESS IN SUCH THINGS AS LOWERING INFLATION AND STABILIZING UNEMPLOYMENT.
- (C) THE FRENCH WERE ALSO ANXIOUS TO ENCOURAGE A U.S.-LED ECONOMIC RECOVERY. THERE WAS A SLIGHT WHIFF OF BLACKMAIL IN DELORS! AND MAUROY'S ASSERTIONS THAT THE PEACE MOVEMENT IN EUROPE MIGHT PREVAIL UNLESS THE U.S. QUICKLY STIMULATED A WORLD-WIDE ECONOMIC RECOVERY. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TWO WAS NOT ELABORATED, ALTHOUGH IT SHOWS THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE FRENCH WILL GO
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